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Abstract 
Using a unique new survey, the Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey 
(JWRPS), this paper documents that there is currently an alarming degree of worker discontent 
in Japan.  Specifically, we find that: (i) nearly one in two Japanese workers usually do not look 
forward to going to work; (ii) almost one third of Japanese workers are dissatisfied with their 
current jobs and do not at all feel loyal to their employers or feel loyal only a little; (iii) nearly 
one in five Japanese workers either do not at all trust information provided by their firm or trust 
such information only a little; and (iv) fully 40 percent of Japanese workers rate labor 
management relations as only fair or poor. Estimating probit models, we find systematic 
evidence that such worker discontent is significantly related to the lack of strong employee voice 
on decisions affecting workplaces, and that the lack of or weakened use of Japan’s once 
celebrated EI programs (such as Shopfloor Committees, Small Group Activities, and Joint 
Labor-Management Committees) is in part responsible for weak voice and hence an alarming 
degree of worker discontent.  An important policy implication of our findings is that weakening 
Japan’s participatory employment system (as the popular rhetoric at times suggests) may result 
in exacerbating the already alarming degree of worker discontent in Japan, and ultimately 
weakening the competitiveness of the Japanese economy.
I. Introduction: the JWRPS and Field Evidence 
Japan was traditionally viewed as a nirvana for employee participation and involvement, 
and attracted much attention and often envy from around the world in the 1980s.1  To promote 
employee participation and involvement, Japanese firms often rely on a bundle of participatory 
employment practices consisting typically of (i) EI (Employee Involvement) programs, including 
Joint Labor Management Committees (JLMCs); Shop Floor Committees (SFCs); and Small 
Group Activities (SGAs); and (ii) financial participation schemes, such as Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs); and Profit Sharing Plans (PSPs).2
In recent years, however, with Japan’s prolonged economic slowdown, the popular 
rhetoric within Japan as well as outside of Japan has been shifting and has become less positive 
about traditional Japanese management with particular emphasis on employee participation and 
involvement (some even suggest the replacement of the participatory system with the Anglo-
                                                 
1As Levine (1995; pp. 115-121) suggests, relatively higher job security and strong group 
cohesiveness (supported by compression of wage and status differentials) of workers in large 
manufacturing firms in the postwar Japanese economy point to an industrial relations system favorable to 
successful employee participation. Moreover, relatively more rapid and stable growth, lower 
unemployment, and stable financial corporate grouping (banks and institutional shareholders as stable, 
long-term suppliers of capital) point to an external environment favorable to successful employee 
participation. Probably as a result of these favorable environments in the postwar Japanese economy, 
particularly in large firms in manufacturing, participatory employment practices spread widely and were 
established firmly (Kato and Morishima, 2002). Indeed, these practices became the hallmark of “Japanese 
management,” which in recent years has been inspiring (or in some instances necessitating) U.S. 
corporate experimentation with employee involvement and labor-management cooperation (Levine, 1995). 
2 JLMC is established at the corporate/establishment level, involves both management and union 
representatives, and serves as a mechanism for representative participation at the top; SFC is established 
at the shop floor level and supervisors and employees on shop floor discuss issues such as shop-floor 
operations and shop-floor environments as well as business plans; and SGA is an activity such as quality 
control (QC) circle and Zero Defects in which small groups at the workplace level voluntarily set plans 
and goals concerning operations and work together toward accomplishing these plans and goals.  ESOP is 
a plan through which the firm forms an ESOP trust consisting of its employees and promotes ownership 
of its own shares by the trust; PSP is a pay system in which the total amount of bonuses are linked to a 
measure of firm performance, such as profit; For EI programs in Japan, see for instance Kato and 
Morishima (2002), Isa and Tsuru (2002), and Kato (2003). For financial participation such as ESOPs and 
PSPs used by Japanese firms, see for instance, Ohashi (1989), Ohkusa and Ohtake (1997), and Kato and 
Morishima (2003) for PSPs, and Jones and Kato (1993, 1995) for ESOPs.   
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American-style shareholder model of corporate governance and active external labor market).3   
While the rhetoric of “the end of the Japanese employment system” is presently rampant, recent 
research on the Japanese economy tends to focus on the financial market, deregulations and 
macroeconomic policies, and systematic evidence on the current state of the Japanese labor 
market, in particular evidence on changes in Japan’s once celebrated participatory employment 
system is relatively scarce.4   
Furthermore, the existing studies on evolving participatory employment practices tend to 
be motivated by two traditional research questions in the literature: (i) what these practices do to 
the firm (e.g., their effects on firm performance);5 and (ii) what kinds of firms are more likely to 
introduce them (e.g., technologically advanced firms with skilled labor force vs. other more 
traditional firms).6  Naturally, the unit of observation in these studies tends to be the firm or the 
establishment and researchers interview and/or survey managers who are familiar with their 
firm’s or establishment’s use of employment practices.  Researchers occasionally add union 
officials to the sample universe yet getting the perspectives of regular front-line employees are 
                                                 
3 See for example a series of proposals and recommendations made by influential associations of 
Japanese business leaders, such as Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) and 
Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) in the last decade.   
4 The recent research focus on the financial market, macroeconomic policies, and deregulations is 
understandable, considering the likely causes of Japan’s prolonged recession in the 1990s.  For reviews of 
the literature on the causes of Japan’s prolonged recession, see for example Patrick (1998) and Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2004).    
5 We are currently witnessing an impressive accumulation of systematic evidence on the effects 
on firm performance of such practices in the U.S.  See, for example, in the economics literature, 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Helper (1998), Batt (1999), Cappelli and Neumark  (1999), 
Freeman, Kleiner, and Ostroff (2000), Appelbaum (2000), Black and Lynch (2001), Hamilton, Nickerson, 
Owan (2003), Bartel (2004), and articles featured in a special issue of Industrial Relations Vol. 35, July 
1996.   However, such evidence is still relatively limited elsewhere.  See, for example, Jones and Kato 
(1995), Kato and Morishima (2002), and Isa and Tsuru (2002) for Japan; Leoni, et. al (2001) for Italy; 
Addison and Belfield (2000) for the U.K.; Eriksson (2003) for Denmark; Bayo-Moriones, Galilea-
Salvatierra, and Merino-Diaz de Cerio (2003) for Spain; Zwick (2004) for German; and Janod and Saint-
Martin (2004) for France.   
6 The adoption literature is smaller than the outcome effect literature.  See, for example, Pil and 
MacDuffie (1996) and Ichniowski and Shaw (1995).  For Japan, see Jones and Kato (1993), Kato and 
Morishima (2002). 
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almost always considered of secondary importance.  Thus, we know little about what regular 
workers think of these practices and what such practices are doing to them?7   
We believe this omission is particularly troublesome in light of the current popular 
rhetoric in Japan that her once celebrated employment system of long-term employment coupled 
with a variety of participatory employment practices ought to be replaced with the Anglo-
American model of active external labor market.  Reliable and systematic evidence on regular 
workers’ perspectives on the current state of Japan’s participatory employment practices is 
urgently needed to inform the public discourse.  For example, as we document  in the paper, 
weakening participatory employment practices is likely to exacerbate the already alarming 
degree of worker discontent in Japan, which could ultimately undermine the global 
competitiveness of the Japanese economy.   
It is against this backdrop of limited data and research on workers’ perspectives that we 
conceived the idea of conducting the Japanese Worker Representation and Participation Survey 
(JWRP).8  The survey was administered in full collaboration with Denki Rengo (Japanese 
Electrical, Electronic, and Information Union) from December of 2003 to January of 2004.  
                                                 
7 The importance of employee perspectives on new work practices has been pointed out forcibly 
by Freeman and Rogers (1999), and a number of attempts have been made to fill this important gap in the 
literature by studying North American workers lately, including Freeman and Rogers (1999), Godard 
(2001), Appelbaum, et. al. (2003), Jones, Kato and Weinberg (2003) and Batt (2004).  Relatedly research 
on the effects on wages of new work practices is currently under way, and new findings are being 
reported (see, for example, Bailey, Berg and Sandy (2003), Handel and Levine (2004), Black, Lynch, and 
Krivelyova (2004), Forth and Millward (2004), and Handel and Gittleman (2004).                
8 Freeman and Rogers (1999) conducted the original Worker Representation and Participation 
Survey (WRPS) and presented the first evidence on what U.S. workers tell us about their experiences with 
the degree of their involvement and influence on firm decisions affecting their worklife in general and the 
impact of new work practices in particular.  As part of a global network of labor economists and industrial 
relations specialists who share the same sense of urgent need to conduct a survey similar to WRPS and 
provide the perspectives of workers, we conducted the JWRPS.  By now there are a number of WRPSs in 
the Anglo-American world (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S.) according to 
a session of the 2005 LERA (formerly IRRA) annual meeting in Philadelphia “Employee Voice in the 
Anglo-American World: Contours & Consequences.”  We believe our survey is the first WRPS outside of 
the Anglo-American world.    
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Denki Rengo covers all regular employees (excluding middle and top management) working for 
nearly all major corporations in the electrical, electronic, and information industries in Japan, and 
its total membership at the time of the survey was 659,729 workers.  We randomly selected 
2,479 workers, and received usable responses from 2,090 of them (a response rate of 84 
percent).9   
The survey itself was preceded by a pilot phase in which an earlier version of the 
instrument was tested on a select group of Denki Rengo members.  On the basis of what we 
learned from this, the questionnaire was revised.   
Our focus on regular full-time workers working for large unionized firms in 
manufacturing is appropriate, for after all the celebrated Japanese employment system applies 
mostly to these workers, and workers in small to medium size firms as well as part-time and 
contingent workers in large firms typically enjoy neither long-term employment nor participatory 
employment practices.10   
Our selection of the electrical, electronic and information industries was motivated in part 
by Denki Rengo’s strong willingness to cooperate with us.11  It was, however, also motivated by 
the fact that the electrical, electronic and information industries are generally considered as one 
                                                 
9 The unusually high response rate of the JWRPS makes our analysis less susceptible to response 
bias which many survey data of this kind often suffer from, due to their typically low response rates.  In 
addition to workers, we also received usable responses from 521 full-time union representatives.  Since 
we are interested in the perspectives of regular workers who work for and paid by the companies, we 
exclude these 521 full-time union representatives who work for unions (and hence do not do any regular 
work for the firms) and are paid not by the firms but by unions.   
10 See, for instance, Koike (1991).       
11 Our long experiences with conducting surveys in Japan teach us that one of the best ways to 
ensure good response rates in Japan is to work with trade unions.  Denki Rengo is known for conducting 
surveys successfully.  Our impressive 84 percent response rate is yet another example of the great benefit 
of working with Denki Rengo.   
 4
of the twin engines of Japan’s export machine.12   Whatever happens to these industries will have 
serious consequences on the overall health of the Japanese economy.  
While the JWRPS enables researchers to address a number of important topical questions, 
in this paper we focus on documenting the current degree of worker discontent and studying its 
link to employee voice and Japan’s celebrated participatory employment practices.  Our decision 
to center on these issues is strongly motivated by a recent case study of the semi-conductor 
industry (which Denki Rengo covers and hence part of the sample universe of our JWRPS).13
Throughout the 1990s, the Japanese semi-conductor industry lost its competitive edge 
considerably in the global market.  Many blamed the lack of decisive actions by top management 
and the weakened prowess of R&D department for such diminished competitiveness of the 
industry. However, detailed field research at work sites points to a serious stagnation of actual 
shop floor work organizations as an equally important culprit of the disappointing performance 
of the industry in the 1990s.  
For example, field research reveals that in many firms in the Japanese semi-conductor 
industry, operators (production workers) have only limited voice on shopfloor decision making.  
There appears to be a wide-spread sentiment that operators are supposed to only follow what 
engineers tell them to do.  Operators are normally not allowed to stop operations even if they 
notice a serious problem in operations.  Quality control engineers develop quality control 
manuals with very little feedback from operators.  Operators have little say about any 
experiments that engineers wish to conduct using actual production lines.  The division between 
engineers and production workers tends to be sharp and rigid, and collaboration between 
                                                 
12 For instance, according to Japan Statistical Yearbook (2004), about 50 percent of total export 
from Japan was equally split between the electrical, electronic and information industries and the 
transportation equipment industry.  We are currently planning to repeat the JWRPS in other industries in 
Japan.    
13 See Chuma (2002).   
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engineers and operators is at best superficial.  In short, the lack of strong voice at workplaces 
appear to be making operators quite discontent with their work and less interested in sharing 
useful local information with engineers and managers. 
In parallel to the diminished voice and weakened collaboration between operators and 
engineers/managers, field research suggests that EI programs have also become less active in the 
semi-conductor industry.  Our JWRPS also provides corroborating evidence.  The survey asks 
each SGA (Small Group Activity) participant whether SGAs are more or less active, compared 
to ten years ago.  Overall, nearly one in two SGA participants believe that SGAs are LESS active 
now than 10 years ago whereas only 17 percent think SGAs are MORE active now in the 
industry.   
Inspired by the above field evidence, this paper will first try to document quantitatively 
that there is an alarmingly wide spread discontent with work and labor-management relations 
among regular full-time workers in large unionized firms in the vitally important exporting 
industries of the Japanese economy.  Specifically, we will find from our analysis of the WRPS 
that: (i) nearly one in two Japanese workers usually do not look forward to going to work; (ii) 
almost one third of Japanese workers are dissatisfied with their current jobs, and do not at all feel 
loyal to their employers or feel loyal only a little; (iii) nearly one in five Japanese workers either 
do not at all trust information provided by their firm or trust such information only a little; and 
(iv) fully 40 percent of Japanese workers rate labor management relations as only fair or as poor.  
Overall these findings are in contrast to a standard view of the Japanese work ethics 
characterized by the robust work motivation of Japanese workers and their strong sense of 
commitment and loyalty to their firms (especially industrial workers in large firms).14    
                                                 
14 Based on a path-breaking cross-national field research, Dore (1973) argues that a coherent 
employment system adopted and practiced effectively by Japanese firms (in particular large industrial 
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Moreover, as the above field evidence suggests, such an alarming degree of worker 
discontent may be caused in part by the lack of strong employee voice on decisions affecting 
workplaces.  We will provide rigorous evidence on such a link between worker discontent and 
voice.  The field evidence further points to an additional hypothesis that employee voice will be 
enhanced by the active use of EI programs (or diminished by the weakened use of EI programs).  
In Section III, we will test this hypothesis using the JWRPS, followed by the concluding section 
in which we summarize the findings, discuss their key implication, and offer a point of hope by 
reporting a recent case from the semi-conductor industry which vividly demonstrates the crucial 
role that employee involvement and empowerment may play in reviving desolated workplace 
morale and restoring the global competitiveness of this important industry.  
  
II. Worker Discontent and Voice in Japan  
 We first document how prevalent employee discontent with jobs and labor-management 
relations is in Japan currently.    Following Freeman and Rogers (1999), we consider a multitude 
of measures to gauge worker discontent with jobs and labor-management relations.  First, we 
consider two measures of the proportion of workers discontented with jobs.  In the JWRPS, we 
ask each worker whether he/she is overall satisfied with his/her current job.  Throughout our 
JWRPS, we follow the convention used by Freeman and Rogers (1999) in their original WRPS, 
and scale responses using a four-point scale: (i) very, (ii) somewhat; (iii) not too; and (iv) not at 
all.15  Thus, our first measure of the proportion of discontented workers is the proportion of 
workers who are not too satisfied or not at all satisfied with their current jobs (%workers with 
                                                                                                                                                             
firms) generates the committed and diligent workforce with strong work motivation and loyalty to their 
firms.  The study inspired a number of scholars to conduct comparative studies of the Japanese and U.S. 
employment systems (see, for example, Koike, 1977; Cole, 1979; and Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1996). 
15 See, Freeman and Rogers (1999) for a lucid discussion on the advantages of the use of four-
point scale over five-point scale with a neutral position.   
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JOB DISSATISFACTIONi=1 where JOB DISSATISFACTIONi=1 if the ith employee is not too 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with their current jobs, 0 otherwise).  In addition, worker 
discontent with jobs can be expressed as their feelings about going to work at the time of leaving 
home for work on an average day.  An alternative measure of the proportion of workers 
discontented with their jobs is then the proportion of workers who agree or somewhat agree that 
they usually do not look forward to going to work (%workers with WEAK MOTIVATIONi=1).16     
 The proportion of workers discontented with labor management relations is gauged by 
three measures: (i) the proportion of workers who feel only a little loyal or not at all loyal to their 
firm (%workers with WEAK LOYALTYi=1); (ii) the proportion of workers who trust 
information provided by their firm only a little or do not trust it at all (%workers with WEAK 
TRUSTi=1);17 and (iii) the proportion of workers who rate labor management relations as only 
fair or as poor (%workers with POOR IRi=1).18   
We believe the aforementioned five variables capture key aspects of worker attitudes 
toward their jobs and management, and can serve as good barometers of the wellbeing or health 
of the workplace.  It seems quite plausible that the workplace will lose vigor, and become 
stagnant when filled with workers who are dissatisfied with their current jobs, do not feel like 
                                                 
16 Again the four-point scale was used: (i) I agree that I look forward to going to work: (ii) I 
somewhat agree that I look forward to going to work; (iii) I somewhat agree that I do not look forward to 
going to work; and (iv) I agree that I do not look forward to going to work.  WEAK MOTIVATIONi=1 if 
the ith employee agrees or somewhat agrees that he/she usually does not look forward to going to work, 0 
otherwise.   
17 The JWRPS asks each respondent to respond to this question in the four-point scale again as 
the original WRPS did (“a lot”, “some”, “only a little”, or “not at all”).  WEAK LOYALTYi=1 if the ith 
employee feels only a little loyal or not at all loyal to their firm , 0 otherwise. WEAK TRUSTi=1 if the ith 
employee trusts information provided by management only a little or not at all, 0 otherwise.     
18 Following the original WRPS, we use the following four-point scale: (i) excellent; (ii) good; 
(iii) only fair; and (iv) poor.  POOR IRi=1 if the ith employee rates labor management relations as only 
fair or as poor , 0 otherwise.     
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going to work every morning, disloyal to their firms, mistrust management, and perceive labor-
management relations negatively.   
Table 1A shows that the proportion of discontented workers in Japan is hardly negligible.   
Over 30 percent of Japanese workers are dissatisfied with their current jobs.  Rather shockingly, 
nearly one in two Japanese workers agree or somewhat agree that they usually do not look 
forward to going to work.  The proportion of Japanese workers with very weak or no loyalty to 
their firm is also nearly 30 percent.  Close to 20 percent of Japanese workers either do not at all 
trust information provided by their firm or trust such information only little.  Finally, surprisingly 
over 40 percent of Japanese workers rate labor management relations as only fair or as poor.19   
 The table further shows the proportion of discontented workers for different groups of 
workers.  First, workers without supervisory responsibilities; and without union leadership 
responsibilities at the grass roots level appear to be more likely to be discontented with various 
aspects of their work than those with such responsibilities.  Second, male workers and workers 
with a college degree are more likely to be discontented workers (the only exception is that male 
workers are LESS likely to have a trust problem with management than female workers).  Third, 
in terms of occupations, office staff members seem to be less discontented with work than other 
occupational groups such as operators, engineers and scientists, and salespersons.  Lastly, the 
proportion of discontented workers tends to fall with age.          
To shed further light on the nature of this alarming degree of worker discontent at current 
workplaces in Japan, we calculated the proportion of discontented workers for workers with 
differing degrees of influence and involvement (or voice) on four different areas of company 
                                                 
19 Cross-national comparison of worker discontent is particularly difficult and it is nearly 
impossible to construct survey instruments that are strictly comparable between Japan and the U.S.  With 
that caution in mind, the degree of employee discontent revealed in our survey appear to be comparable or 
even greater than what Freeman and Rogers (1999) discovered for U.S. workers (especially the proportion 
of workers with weak motivation in Japan appears to be alarmingly high).       
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decisions affecting workplaces: (i) deciding on how to do job and organize the work; (ii) setting 
work schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off; (iii) setting goals for work group or 
department; and (vi) deciding on what training is needed for people in work group or department.  
As shown in Table 1B, workers lacking strong voice on each company decision (or workers with 
VOICEJOBi=0; VOICETIMEi=0; VOICEGOALi=0; or VOICESKILLi=0) appear to be more 
likely to have discontent with jobs and labor management relations.   
To provide compelling evidence, however, that the lack of voice leads to worker 
discontent, it is necessary to establish the significant link between the lack of strong voice and 
worker discontent after controlling for a variety of variables which may affect worker discontent.  
To this end, we specify the following Probit model.  Thus, we assume for the ith employee that: 
(1)   Pr(DISCONTENTi = 1) = F(αVOICEi, Xiß) 
For DISCONTENTi, as discussed earlier, the data allow us to consider five specific 
variables: (i) JOB DISSATISFACTIONi (=1 if the ith employee is not too satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with their current jobs, 0 otherwise); (ii) WEAK MOTIVATIONi (=1 if the ith employee 
agrees or somewhat agrees that he/she usually does not look forward to going to work, 0 
otherwise); (iii) WEAK LOYALTYi (=1 if the ith employee feels only a little loyal or not at all 
loyal to their firm , 0 otherwise); (iv) WEAK TRUSTi (=1 if the ith employee trusts information 
provided by management only a little or not at all, 0 otherwise); and (v) POOR IRi (=1 if the ith 
employee rates labor management relations as only fair or as poor , 0 otherwise).   
For VOICEi, as we discussed before, the data permits us to consider the following four 
dummy variables capturing whether the ith employee lacks strong voice on each of the four 
important company decisions affecting workplaces: (i) VOICEJOBi (=1 if the ith employee has a 
lot of involvement and influence on deciding how to do his/her job and organize the work, 0 
 10
otherwise); (ii) VOICETIMEi (=1 if the ith employee has a lot of involvement and influence on 
setting work schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off, 0 otherwise); (iii) 
VOICEGOALi (=1 if the ith employee has a lot of involvement and influence on setting goals for 
his/her work group or department, 0 otherwise); and (iv) VOICESKILLi (=1 if the ith employee 
has a lot of involvement and influence on deciding what training is needed for people in his/her 
work group or department, 0 otherwise). 
The statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on each VOICE variable, α is of 
prime interest.  That α<0 supports our hypothesis that weak voice produces discontented workers.         
Xi is a vector of variables that may affect the DISCONTENT variables.  The JWPRS 
provides us with a rich set of such control variables.  Having supervisory responsibilities may 
make the nature of work less repetitive and routine, and hence more fulfilling, resulting in a 
lower level of worker discontent for workers with supervisory responsibilities as compared to 
workers without such responsibilities.  On the other hand, having supervisory responsibilities 
may make workers more prone to stress and disappointment, leading to a higher level of worker 
discontent for workers with supervisory responsibilities.  To control for any possible impact on 
worker discontent of having supervisory responsibilities, we consider a dummy variable 
NORANKi (=1 if the ith employee has no supervisory responsibilities, 0 otherwise).  As shown 
in Table 2, 64 percent of workers in our sample have no supervisory responsibilities. 
A similar argument could be made for union responsibilities.  Thus, to control for the 
possible effects on worker discontent of having union responsibilities, we also consider a dummy 
variable LEADERi (=1 if the ith employee is a grassroots-level union representative, 0 
otherwise).  Table 2 shows that 39 percent of workers have some union responsibilities at the 
grassroots level although all of them carry out their regular work as full-time employees while 
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fulfilling union responsibilities after hours except that they are allowed to leave their workplaces 
during regular hours when attending SFCs (Shop Floor Committees) as shop floor union 
representatives.  Their hours absent from work due to participation in SFCs are paid by unions.       
Conceivably the level of worker discontent differs significantly between different 
occupations.  To control for possible cross-occupational differences in worker discontent, we 
consider four occupational dummy variables: (i) OPERATORi (=1 if the ith employee is working 
in production as an operator or a maintenance worker, 0 otherwise (omitted as a reference group 
in the regressions). (ii) ENGINEERi (=1 if the ith employee is an engineer or a scientist, 0 
otherwise; (iii) STAFFi (=1 if the ith employee is an office staff member, 0 otherwise); and (iv) 
SALESi (=1 if the ith employee is a salesperson, 0 otherwise).  Table 2 shows that 44 percent of 
union members in the Electrical, Electronic, and Information industries in Japan are presently 
engineers or scientists working in technical fields; and the 26 percent are “blue-collar” workers 
working in production as operators or as maintenance workers.  The remaining 30 percent are 
split between salespersons and office staff members working in accounting, finance, human 
resources and other staff functions.   
To control for standard biographical characteristics, we further consider: (i)  MALEi (=1 
if the ith employee is male, 0 otherwise); (ii) AGEi =age of the ith employee; and (iii) 
HIGHEDUi (=1 if the ith employee has a college degree, 0 otherwise).  As shown in Table 2, 85 
percent of workers are male with mean age of 36, and about one in two workers have some 
college degrees beyond high school diplomas.  Finally, ß is a vector of unknown coefficients; 
and F(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.20
                                                 
20 In addition to those control variables, we also consider a location dummy (indicating whether 
an employee lives in Tokyo), and ten wage level dummy variables: w350=1 if an employee's wage is less 
than 350,000 yen per year, 0 otherwise; w375=1 if an employee's wage is between 350,000 and 400,000, 
0 otherwise; W425=1 if an employee's wage is between 400,000 and 450,000, 0 otherwise; W475=1 if an 
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The maximum likelihood estimates of Eq. (1) using JOB DISSATISFACTION as the 
DISCONTENT variable are reported in Table 3.  As shown in Columns (i)-(iv) of the table, the 
estimated coefficients on VOICE are all negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level (except for the case of VOICE=VOICESKILL in which it is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level).21  As such, we find consistent evidence supporting our hypothesis that weak voice 
(or the lack of strong voice) results in worker discontent measured by JOB 
DISSATISFACTION.22  The link of weak voice to worker discontent measured by JOB 
DISSATISFACTION is found consistently for all four measures of VOICE (VOICEJOB, 
VOICETIME, VOICEGOAL, and VOICESKILL). 
Many of the control variables also turn out to be statistically significantly related to 
worker discontent as measured by JOB DISSATISFACTION.  Specifically, JOB 
DISSATISFACTION will be significantly greater for workers without supervisory 
responsibilities than workers with such responsibilities; for male workers than for female 
workers; for workers with a college degree than workers without such a degree; and for workers 
without union responsibilities than workers with such responsibilities.   
Finally, to discern the relative importance of voice on each of the four areas of decision, 
we consider all four VOICE variables simultaneously.  The last column of the table presents the 
                                                                                                                                                             
employee's wage is between 450,000 and 500,000, 0 otherwise; W525=1 if an employee's wage is 
between 5000,000 and 550,000, 0 otherwise; W575=1 if an employee's wage is between 550,000 and 
600,000, 0 otherwise; w625=1 if an employee's wage is between 600,000 and 650,000, 0 otherwise; 
W675=1 if an employee's wage is between 650,000 and 700,000, 0 otherwise; W725=1 if an employee's 
wage is between 700,000 and 750,000, 0 otherwise; and w775=1 if an employee's wage is between 
750,000 and 800,000, 0 otherwise.  W800 (=1 if an employee's wage is 800,000 or more yen per year, 0 
otherwise) is omitted as a reference group in the regressions.  While multicollinearity makes the estimates 
somewhat less precise overall, we find no discernable change in the estimated coefficients on VOICE.  
These and other unreported results are available from Takao Kato at tkato@mail.colgate.edu upon request.         
21 For the sake of exposition, from now on, we omit subscripts i.   
22 Since our data are not panel data, unfortunately we are unable to control for unobserved worker 
heterogeneity that is time-invariant, such as innate ability and general attitude.    
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estimates of such a nested specification.  The estimated coefficients on VOICEJOB and 
VOICEGOAL are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level whereas the estimated 
coefficients on VOICETIME and VOICESKILL are not statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level.  It appears that lacking strong voice on deciding how to do job and organize the work and 
setting group goals is more damaging for job satisfaction than lacking strong voice on setting 
work schedules and deciding training needs.        
Tables 4-7 present the maximum likelihood estimates of Eq. (1), using different 
DISCONTENT variables.  First, as shown in Table 4 with WEAK MOTIVATION as the 
DISCONTENT variable, the estimated coefficients on VOICE are again all negative, and 
statistically significant for three of the four specifications (i.e., VOICE=VOICEJOB, 
VOICETIME, and VOICEGOAL) and close to significant with VOICE=VOICESKILL).  The 
evidence supports that weak employee voice produces discontented workers who usually do not 
look forward to going to work.  The nested specification considering all VOICE variables 
together reveals again the relative importance of VOICEJOB and VOICEGOAL over 
VOICETIME and VOICESKILL in the incidence of discontented workers who do not look 
forward to going to work.       
Second, Table 5 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of Eq. (1), using WEAK 
LOYALTY as the DISCONTENT variable.  The estimated coefficients on VOICEJOB and 
VOICETIME are again negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The estimated 
coefficients on VOICEGOAL and VOICESKILL are also negative though not quite significant 
at the 10 percent level.  Overall, the evidence is again consistent with our hypothesis that the lack 
of strong voice generates more discontented workers with weak loyalty to their company.  
Among the four areas of decision, the lack of strong voice on deciding how to do job and 
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organize the work is proven to be the most important contributor to the incidence of discontented 
workers with weak loyalty.     
Table 6 shows when WEAK TRUST is considered as the DISCONTENT variable, the 
estimated coefficients on VOICE are yet again all negative, and statistically significant at least at 
the 10 percent level with VOICETIME and VOICEGOAL as the VOICE variable.  Insofar as 
employee voice on setting work schedules, and setting group goals are concerned, the absence of 
strong voice tends to produce more discontented workers with weak trust on management.  As 
shown in the nested specification, the most important voice in terms of its impact on trust is the 
one on setting work schedules.   
Finally, as shown in Table 7, with POOR IR as the DISCONTENT variable, the 
estimated coefficients on VOICE are negative for all four specifications and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level in the first two specifications in which VOICEJOB and 
VOICETIME are considered as the VOICE variable.  Workers lacking strong voice on deciding 
how to do job and organize the work; and setting work schedules are more likely to view labor-
management relations poor, and are discontented with industrial relations.   
 
III. The Efficacy of Japanese EI Programs 
As Levine and Tyson (1990) suggest, relatively greater job security and strong group 
cohesiveness of Japanese workers in large manufacturing companies in the postwar era point to 
an industrial relations system favorable to successful employee participation.  In addition, steady 
economic growth over the sample period, lower unemployment and stable financial corporate 
grouping point to an external environment favorable to successful employee participation. 
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Probably as a result of these favorable environments in the postwar Japanese economy, in 
particular in manufacturing, participatory employment practices diffused widely and were 
established firmly (Kato and Morishima, 2002).  Indeed these practices became the hallmark of 
“Japanese management,” which has been rousing (or requiring in some instances) many U.S. 
corporations to experiment with employee involvement and labor-management cooperation 
lately (see, for instance, Levine, 1995: 5). In short, the postwar Japanese economy (especially in 
manufacturing) clearly represents one of the most important examples of experimentation with 
participatory employment practices.23  
The JWRPS enables us for the first time to investigate whether Japan’s celebrated 
participatory employment practices are indeed helping Japanese workers develop a strong sense 
of involvement and influence on company decisions affecting their workplaces.  It is particularly 
timely to study the link between participatory employment practices and employee sense of 
involvement and influence at this time in light of the popular rhetoric that once-celebrated 
Japanese participatory management is now less relevant and sometime even harmful in the 
rapidly changing globalized marketplace.      
As shown in Table 8, we consider three EI (Employee Involvement) programs which are 
often considered key work practices of participatory Japanese management in the literature.24  
The table confirms the prevalence of these practices among Japanese workers in the electrical, 
                                                 
23 The economic slowdown in the 1990s and a rapidly aging workforce in Japan have allegedly 
been eroding the aforementioned participation-friendly environments.  See Kato (2001, 2003a), Chuma 
(1998, 2002), Ohashi and Tachibanaki (1998), and Kuruvilla and Erickson (2002) for evolving 
employment practices in Japan. 
24 As discussed earlier, Japan’s participatory employment system consists of these EI programs 
and financial participation schemes such as PSPs (Profit Sharing Plans) and ESOPs (Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans).  We are focusing on the EI programs in this paper, for the primary objective of EI 
programs is to enhance voice whereas it is less clear what financial participation schemes will do to voice 
itself (perhaps enhance employee desire for voice).  We plan to study the impact on employee desire for 
voice of financial participation schemes in a separate paper.     
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electronic, and information industries.  As such, over 60 percent of workers work for firms with 
SFCs (Shop Floor Committees) in which supervisors and employees on shop floor regularly 
discuss issues such as shop-floor operations and shop-floor environments.  Among those workers 
in firms with SFCs, about one in two workers always attend SFC meetings.   
Somewhat surprisingly, only 43 percent of workers in the electrical, electronic and 
information industries work in firms with SGAs (Small Group Activities) such as quality control 
(QC) circles and Zero Defects in which small groups at the workplace level voluntarily set plans 
and goals concerning operations and work together toward accomplishing these plans and goals.  
This is in part due to the fact that a significant number of firms in the industries terminated SGAs 
in recent years.25  On the other hand, the participation rate of workers in firms with SGAs is 
remarkably high (87 percent), confirming that Japanese SGAs are indeed broad-based.   
One of the core mechanisms for labor-management relations within a large Japanese firm 
is joint labor-management committees (JLMCs).  Established at the top level (corporate and/or 
establishment level) and involving both management and union representatives, JLMCs serve as 
a mechanism for employee participation/involvement at the top level, covering a large variety of 
issues ranging from basic business policies to working conditions.26  As Kato (2003b) shows, the 
productivity effects of JLMCs vary significantly, depending on how widely information shared 
in JLMCs is disseminated to the rank and files.  To this end, we calculate the proportion of 
workers who agree that nearly all information provided in JLMCs is widely disseminated to them.  
                                                 
25 Chuma (2003) documents the rising importance of information sharing between production 
workers and design and development engineers as the complexity of production process rises in Japan.  
Traditional SGAs with heavy reliance on production workers’ problem solving skills may be less 
effective in recent years with the rising complexity of manufacturing process.  We will examine this 
important issue in more details in our forthcoming paper. 
26 See, for example, Kato (2003a) for detailed institutional information on JLMCs.   
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Approximately 9 percent of workers agree that nearly all information provided in JLMCs reaches 
them.27     
We expect these EI programs (SFCs, SGAs and JLMCs) to enhance employee sense of 
involvement and influence (or employee voice) since after all the main objective of these 
institutions is to foster employee voice.  Table 9 shows preliminary evidence on the link between 
EI programs and VOICE.  Specifically, workers in firms with SFCs, SGAs and JLMCs with full 
information sharing are indeed more likely to have strong voice (regardless of which of the four 
areas of decision is considered) than other workers.  For SFCs and SGAs, the JWRPS will allow 
us to further examine if among workers in firms with each program, workers who actively 
participate in each program are more likely to have strong voice.  Table 9 provides preliminary 
evidence that active participation in SFCs and SGAs appear to be in fact beneficial for workers 
enhancing voice.   
Like in the previous section, to test more systematically and rigorously our hypothesis 
that EI programs enhance voice, we specify the following Probit model.  Thus, we assume for 
the ith employee that: 
(2)   Pr(VOICE = 1) = F(γEI, Xß) 
For EI, as discussed above, we consider three major programs used widely by large firms in 
Japan: (i) SFC (=1 if the ith employee works in a firm with SFCs, 0 otherwise); (ii) SGA (=1 if 
the ith employee works in a firm with SGAs, 0 otherwise); and (iii) JLMC (=1 if the ith 
employee believes that nearly all information shared in JLMCs is made available to him/her, 0 
otherwise).  In addition, among those in firms with SFCs, the data further allow us to create SFC 
PARTICIPATE (=1 if the ith employee almost always attends SFC meetings, 0 otherwise).  
                                                 
27 Since we excluded all full-time union officials from our sample, no worker in the sample 
actually attends JLMCs.   
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Likewise, among those in firms with SGAs, the data allow for the use of SGA PARTICIPATE 
(=1 if the ith employee participates in SGAs, 0 otherwise).   
The statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on each EI variable, γ is of our 
main interest.  That γ>0 supports our hypothesis that EI programs enhance employee voice. For 
control variables, X, we use the same set of variables used in the previous section.   Finally, ß is a 
vector of unknown coefficients; and F(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution func-
tion.28      
The maximum likelihood estimates of Eq. (2) with VOICEJOB as the VOICE variable 
are reported in Table 10.  As shown in Column (i) of the table, the estimated coefficients on SFC 
are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that workers in firms 
with SFCs are more likely to have strong voice on deciding how to do job and organize the work 
than other workers.  Likewise, as shown in Columns (ii) and (iii), the estimated coefficients on 
SGA and JLMC are also positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for SGA and 
at the 1 percent level for JLMC, indicating that workers in firms with SGAs and workers with 
full information sharing JLMCs are more apt to have strong voice on deciding how to do job and 
organize the work than other workers.   
                                                 
28 It is possible that unobserved individual heterogeneity affects both VOICE in Eq. (2) and 
DISCONTENT in Eq. (1), making a simple probit estimation of Eq. (1) subject to endogeneity bias.  To 
correct for such a bias, we re-estimated Eq. (1), using LIMDEP’s “two-step estimation using binary choice 
models (LIMDEP Version 8 Econometric Modeling Guide Volume 1 E15-54 to E15-58).” Like in most 
cases of such IV (Instrumental Variable) estimations, our hands were somewhat tied due to the scarcity of 
reliable instruments.  Nonetheless, we managed to obtain the IV estimates by collecting (and using as 
additional instrumental variables) supplementary data on firm characteristics: (i) firm size measured by 
employment, sales and asset; (ii) profitability such as ROA and ROE; and (iii) labor force composition 
such as average wage and age.  Though the validity of these instruments can be debatable, reassuringly all 
previously significant coefficients on VOICE in Eq. (1) are found to be still negative and statistically 
significant even if we use predicted values for VOICE from the first-step estimation of Eq. (2) instead of 
actual values for VOICE.     
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To see the relative importance of each of the three EI programs, we also consider SFC, 
SGA and JLMC simultaneously.  As shown in Column (iv) of Table 10, the estimated 
coefficients on SFC, SGA and JLMC are still all statistically significant at least at the 10 percent 
level, pointing to the robustness of the link of each EI program to voice.       
Furthermore, as Column (v) of the table indicates, among workers in firms with SFCs, 
workers who almost always attend SFC meetings are more likely to have strong voice on 
deciding how to do job than other workers.  Note that the positive relationship between SFC 
meeting attendance and voice is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, having controlled 
for a variety of variables, in particular LEADER (a dummy variable indicating whether a worker 
is a shopfloor union representative).  Similarly, as shown in the last column, among workers in 
firms with SGAs, whether a worker has strong voice on deciding on his/her work is significantly 
influenced by his participation in SGAs (the link of SGA participation to VOICE is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level).     
While our primary interest is the estimated coefficients on EI, the signs of the estimated 
coefficients on our control variables are reassuringly as expected.  Focusing on the statistically 
significant estimates, workers without supervisory responsibilities are less likely to have strong 
voice than workers with such responsibilities; male workers more likely to have strong voice 
than female workers; older workers more likely to have strong voice than younger workers; 
office staff members and sales persons are more likely to have strong voice than operators.29  
Tables 11-13 present the maximum likelihood estimates of Eq. (2), focusing on voice on 
different areas of decision making (VOICETIME, VOICEGOAL, VOICESKILL as the VOICE 
                                                 
29 As we did in our estimation of Eq. (1), we also added a location dummy (indicating whether an 
employee lives in Tokyo), and wage level dummy variables to the right-hand side.  Again, while 
multicollinearity makes the overall estimates somewhat less precise, we found no discernable change in 
the estimated coefficients on EI. 
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variable).  As shown in Table 11, the results using VOICETIME are very similar to those using 
VOICEJOB, supporting strongly our hypothesis that EI programs enhance voice on setting work 
schedules, including breaks, overtime and time off.   
Though the results using VOICEGOAL and VOICESKILL are somehow less significant 
overall, as Tables 12 and 13 show, the estimated coefficients on SGA are still consistently 
significant at the 1 percent, suggesting that SGAs enhance voice on the other two areas as well 
(namely on setting goals for his/her work group or department; and deciding what training is 
needed for people in his/her work group or department). 
Finally, as an alternative way to assess the effectiveness of EI programs, we estimate the 
direct relationship between worker discontent and EI programs.  That is,     
(3)   Pr(DISCONTENT = 1) = F(δEI, Xß) 
That δ<0 confirms the significant role that EI programs play in preventing workers from 
becoming discontented with their jobs and labor-management relations.  Table 14 highlights the 
key results.  Overall, as expected, EI programs are negatively and significantly related to worker 
discontent.  In particular, JLMCs with full information sharing are found to play a particularly 
significant role in preventing workers from building up a sense of mistrust on management and a 
poor assessment of labor-management relationships, which appears to be quite plausible.     
   
IV. Conclusions 
Using a unique new survey of Japanese workers in the electrical, electronic and 
information industries, the JWRPS, we have discovered that presently there is an alarming 
degree of worker discontent in Japan.  Specifically, almost one third of Japanese workers are 
dissatisfied with their current jobs and even more shockingly almost one in two Japanese 
 21
workers usually do not look forward to going to work.  Nearly one third of Japanese workers do 
not at all feel loyal to their employers or feel loyal only a little.  Almost one in five Japanese 
workers either do not at all trust information provided by their firm or trust such information 
only a little.  Finally, fully 40 percent of Japanese workers rate labor management relations as 
only fair or as poor.  
We have found systematic evidence that such worker discontent is significantly related to 
the lack of strong employee involvement and influence (or strong voice).  As such, the evidence 
is consistent with our hypothesis that the lack of strong voice produces discontented workers.  
Furthermore, evidence has been found that strong employee voice is significantly linked to the 
presence of EI programs such as SFCs (Shop Floor Committees), SGAs (Small Group Activities) 
and full information sharing JLMCs (Joint Labor-Management Committees) as well as actual 
participation in such programs, suggesting that these celebrated Japanese work practices indeed 
enhance employee voice.  It follows that weakening participatory employment practices as the 
popular rhetoric sometimes suggests may result in exacerbating the already alarming degree of 
discontent with work and labor management relations among Japanese workers, which may 
ultimately undermine the competitiveness of the Japanese economy.30   
We end the paper with our most recent field research at a medium size semi-conductor 
firm with about 800 employees.  This firm has succeeded in developing a strong partnership 
between operators and engineers and enhancing production efficiency and quality by restoring 
employee involving and empowerment of operators in various local decision making.  As such , 
the case vividly demonstrates the crucial role that employee involvement and empowerment may 
                                                 
30 For more direct econometric evidence on the positive link between Japanese EI programs and 
firm performance, see for example, Morishima (1991a; 1991b) and Kato and Morishima (2002).    
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play in reviving desolated workplace morale and restoring the global competitiveness of the 
Japanese semi-conductor industry.   
At this firm, operators are now allowed to stop operations when a serious problem is 
detected.  Operators and engineers then jointly engage in problem solving activities.  Operators 
do not blindly follow what engineers instruct.  For instance, operators question the value of any 
changes in quality control manuals proposed by engineers and do not accept until they are 
convinced of the value of such proposed changes.  Furthermore, when engineers propose to 
conduct an experiment with actual production lines, operators have a right to veto such a 
proposal and indeed the veto right has been exercised on grounds of insufficient value added 
expected from the experiment.  Even the proposed experiment is approved by operators and 
subsequently conducted, engineers and operators involved with the experiment meet to assess 
jointly the validity of the experiment.   
Lastly, the firm holds the all-employee meeting every morning with top management 
present.  The director of operation reports the previous day’s production and explains the day’s 
production plan, followed by a series of questions and answers (which are often substantive and 
engaging).  This way all employees from CEO to regular operators possess the same information 
and develop a strong goal alignment among all employees, in particular between operators and 
engineers/supervisors.  The daily all-employee meeting is considered a JLMC meeting with full 
and direct participation of all employees (and hence a full information sharing JLMC).               
By fostering employee involvement and empowerment, the firm is successfully tapping 
into local information and know-how of operators, nurturing a strong partnership between 
engineers and operators, and reviving the innovative prowess.  As a result, based on a number of 
standard efficiency and quality measures used by the industry, this firm is presently far 
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outperforming its competitors, and is becoming a popular benchmark site for many Japanese 
firms to visit.31 
   
                                                 
31 As a result of the much publicized success of our case, its CEO and director of operation who 
initiated and implemented the strategy to enhance voice and tap into the power of the local collaboration 
between operators and engineers were recently invited to replicate and expand the strategy in a much 
larger firm in the industry.  The firm has recently reported much improved efficiency and quality, offering 
yet another field evidence pointing to the importance of employee involvement and participation.   
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